TINUBU’S STATE POLICE PUSH: WHY REGIONAL FORMATIONS OFFER THE SAFER PATH TO TRUE FEDERALISM
By Chyma Anthony
On a calm evening at the Presidential Villa in Abuja, as lawmakers gathered for an interfaith Iftar, President Bola Ahmed Tinubu spoke with unusual urgency. Nigeria, he said, cannot continue to battle escalating insecurity with a policing structure designed for another era. The solution, in his view, lies in decentralization — specifically, the creation of state police through amendments to the 1999 Constitution (as amended).
The President urged the National Assembly to accelerate constitutional reforms that would give legal backing to state police formations. In subsequent meetings with governors, he reinforced the message: policing must move closer to the people. Communities ravaged by banditry, insurgency, and violent crime need security structures that understand their terrain, language, and peculiar threats. For many Nigerians, his call resonates as both bold and overdue.
Across the legislature, momentum has been building. Bills such as HB 617 — a Constitution Alteration Bill seeking to amend key provisions including Sections 214 and 215 — propose allowing federal and state police to coexist, with safeguards to prevent abuse. Supporters argue that this aligns with the principle of subsidiarity: powers should reside at the level best positioned to exercise them effectively. The Senate has signaled willingness to fast-track such amendments, citing the overstretched nature of the Nigeria Police Force as clear evidence that reform can no longer wait.
Yet beneath the optimism lies a sobering question: is full-fledged state police the safest route in Nigeria’s current socio-political climate?
Nigeria’s 36 states — plus the Federal Capital Territory — vary widely in resources, political culture, and institutional maturity. Establishing 37 separate police forces could create complex border enforcement challenges, potentially leading to overlapping jurisdictions, inconsistent standards, and friction between neighboring states. Resource-poor states might struggle to fund adequately trained and equipped units. There are also concerns, frequently voiced in policy debates, that governors could exert undue influence over state-controlled forces, heightening fears of politicization or misuse during elections and communal disputes.
Coordination is another risk. Criminal networks do not respect state boundaries. Fragmented intelligence systems and competing command structures could unintentionally widen security gaps rather than close them. For a country already navigating ethnic and regional sensitivities, excessive localization without strong safeguards may deepen mistrust.
It is within this delicate balance that the argument for regional policing emerges — not as a rejection of decentralization, but as a calibrated evolution of it.
Structuring police formations along Nigeria’s six geopolitical zones — North West, North East, North Central, South East, South West, and South-South — could provide a middle ground. Regional commands would be large enough to maintain professional standards and resource pools, yet close enough to local realities to respond swiftly and intelligently. Such an arrangement could reduce the risk of fragmentation while strengthening operational cohesion.
Comparative examples offer perspective. In Canada and Germany, policing responsibilities are largely provincial or state-based, supported by federal oversight to ensure uniform standards. India operates a state policing system within a strong federal constitutional framework. Meanwhile, South Africa runs a hybrid model through the South African Police Service, combining national leadership with provincial operational control. These systems illustrate how decentralization can coexist with cohesion when clear safeguards and oversight mechanisms are in place.
Closer to home, Nigeria’s own experience offers lessons. The Western Nigeria Security Network, popularly known as Amotekun, was launched in 2020 across the South West states to confront rising insecurity. Its regional collaboration, reliance on local intelligence, and swift operational response have been credited with reducing incidents of kidnapping and rural violence in several communities. While not without limitations — particularly in training, coordination, and legal clarity — Amotekun demonstrates how zone-level initiatives can harness grassroots trust and cultural familiarity more effectively than distant centralized command structures.
However, decentralization without accountability would merely shift problems rather than solve them. Reforming the Police Service Commission becomes essential. Proposals under consideration include upgrading it into a strengthened National Police Service Commission responsible for setting nationwide recruitment, promotion, and disciplinary standards, alongside regional or state commissions handling localized appointments subject to federal certification. Safeguards could include clear referral mechanisms to counter unlawful directives and regular performance audits to maintain professionalism and impartiality.
A carefully structured regional framework might include six Regional Police Headquarters aligned with the geopolitical zones, each headed by a Regional Police Commander serving as liaison with federal authorities. Sub-units would operate at state and local levels, while funding structures — potentially including direct federal allocations — would protect operational independence from undue political interference.
In essence, President Tinubu’s advocacy for security decentralization is both visionary and necessary. Nigeria’s current security realities demand reform. Yet the path chosen must strengthen the federation rather than strain it. Regional police formations, embedded within constitutional amendments and robust institutional safeguards, present a pragmatic compromise — responsive without being reckless, localized without being fragmented.
True federalism is not achieved by dismantling central authority entirely, nor by clinging rigidly to over-centralization. It is realized through thoughtful devolution anchored in accountability, equity, and national cohesion. If Nigeria is to secure its people while preserving unity, reform must be measured, evidence-based, and institutionally grounded.
The debate, therefore, is not whether to decentralize policing — but how to do so wisely.
By Chyma Anthony, PhD
Lawyer and Police Reform Expert
Holds Doctoral Degree PhD in Security and Strategic Studies; LL.B, LL.M, BL.
chyma@chymaanthony.com
